Self-Organized Authentication Architecture for Mobile Ad-hoc Networks by Caballero-Gil, P. et al.
Self-Organized Authentication Architecture for
Mobile Ad-hoc Networks
P. Caballero-Gil∗, C. Caballero-Gil†, J. Molina-Gil †, C. Herna´ndez-Goya∗
∗Dept. Statistics, Operations Research and Computing. University of La Laguna. 38271 La Laguna. Tenerife.
Spain. E-mail: pcaballe,mchgoya@ull.es
†Dept. Informatics and Systems. University of Las Palmas de Gran Canaria. 35017 Las Palmas de Gran Canaria.
Gran Canaria. Spain. E-mail: candido.caballero,jezabelmiriam@gmail.com
Abstract—This work proposes a new architecture, called
Global Authentication Scheme for Mobile Ad-hoc Networks
(GASMAN), for fully distributed and self-organized authenti-
cation. In this paper apart from describing all the GASMAN
components, special emphasis is placed on proving that it fulfils
every requirement of a secure distributed authentication scheme,
including limited physical protection of broadcast medium, fre-
quent route changes caused by mobility, lack of structured hier-
archy, etc. Furthermore, an extensive analysis through simulation
experiments in different scenarios is described and discussed.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Network security consists of several services such as authen-
tication, confidentiality, integrity, non-repudiation, and access
control. Among these facilities, authentication, which ensures
the true identities of nodes, is the most fundamental one
because other services depend fully on the sure authentication
of communication entities.
Mobile Ad-hoc NETworks (MANETs) are autonomous
networks formed by mobile nodes that are free to move
at will. These networks have received increasing interest in
the last years, partly owing to their potential applicability
to myriad applications, ranging from small, static networks
that are constrained by power sources, to large-scale, mobile
and highly dynamic networks. Conventional wired networks
mainly use a globally trusted Certificate Authority (CA) for
solving the authentication problem. However, authentication
in MANETs is undoubtedly much more difficult to solve due
to several reasons such as the absence of a fixed infrastructure
and centralized management, the dynamic nature of the nodes,
the limited wireless range of nodes, the dynamic topology,
frequent link failures and possible transmission errors [1]
[12]. Also, since all the nodes must collaborate to forward
data, the wireless channel is prone to active and passive
attacks by malicious nodes, such as Denial of Service (DoS),
eavesdropping, spoofing, etc.
One of the most elementary approaches to authentication
in MANETs found in the bibliography uses a Trusted Third
Party (TTP) to guarantee the validity of all nodes identities
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so that every node who wants to join the network has to get
a certificate from the TTP. A second identification paradigm
that has been used in wireless ad-hoc networks is the notion
of chain of trust [8]. A third typical solution is location-
limited authentication, which is based on the fact that most ad-
hoc networks exist in small areas and physical authentication
may be carried out between nodes that are close to each
other. The special nature of ad-hoc networks, where most
applications are collaborative and group-based, suggests that
such traditional approaches to node identification may not be
always appropriate. As an example of this fact, we have that
different authentication protocols have been recently proposed
for ad-hoc networks but all of them have some drawback. For
instance, the work [7] is based on the RSA signature, which
conducts to the problem of public key certification. Another
recent example is the paper [11], which provides a solution
that works well just for short-lived MANETs. Thus, the design
of a new scheme that fulfils all the requirements for this type
of networks continues being considered an open question.
Here we propose a new architecture for authentication in
ad-hoc networks called Global Authentication Scheme for
Mobile Ad-hoc Networks (GASMAN), which is based on
the established cryptographic paradigm of Zero-Knowledge
Proofs (ZKPs). Since the information sent while its exe-
cution does not convey any secret related to the authenti-
cation process, ZKPs provide an elegant and fault-tolerant
solution to node authentication in MANETs. Furthermore,
the GASMAN has other three beneficial properties. Firstly,
it has scalability because centralized elements, such as CA
servers, are not required. Secondly, availability is guaranteed
through the insertion, deletion and access control procedures.
Finally, our architecture assures strong authentication to any
legitimate node willing to join the network by using the zero-
knowledge proof implemented in the access control algorithm.
The GASMAN algorithms jointly with mobility help to reduce
the time necessary for nodes to join and access the network
in a timely manner. Summing up, the main features of the
proposed protocol are the adaptation to the varying topology
of the network, the open availability of broadcast transmissions
and the strong access control.
Up to now, very few publications have mentioned the
proposal of authentication systems for ad-hoc networks using
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ZKPs [2] [13], and none of them has dealt with the related
problem of topology changes in the network. A recent ZKP-
based hierarchical proposal for MANETs related with the one
proposed here was described in [4], where two different secu-
rity levels were defined through the use of a hard-on-average
graph problem, and no topology changes were considered.
This work is organized as follows. The following section
provides an overview of the proposal, some general aspects of
the proposal and the notation used in its description. Specific
details about the five principal elements of the architecture, i.e.,
network initialization, node insertion, access control, proofs
of life and node deletion are gathered in Section III. The
assumptions required by GASMAN and an analysis of its
security are commented in Section IV. A performance analysis
developed under NS-2 is provided in Section V. Finally, some
conclusions and open questions complete the paper.
II. BASICS AND NOTATION
The proposed protocol was designed as an authentication
scheme for group membership because when a node wants
to be part of the network, it has to be previously authorized
by a legitimate node. According to the authors of [10], in
any group member authentication protocol it is necessary to
provide robust methods to insert and to delete nodes, as well
as to allow the access only for legitimate members of the
group. For that reason, not only the ZKP used for access
control is described, but also the update procedures associated
to insertions and deletions are carefully defined. For instance,
the procedure to delete nodes is only initiated once a node has
been disconnected of the network for too long. The period of
time after which the node is deleted is a parameter (T ) of the
system here presented.
The access control described below is based on the general
scheme of Zero-Knowledge Proof introduced in [3], when
using the Hamiltonian Cycle Problem (HCP). A Hamiltonian
cycle in a graph is a cycle that visits each vertex exactly once
and returns to the starting vertex. Determining whether such
cycles exist in a graph defines the Hamiltonian Cycle Problem,
which is NP-complete. Such a problem was chosen for our
design mainly due to the low cost of the operations associated
to the update of a solution. This is an important characteristic
since in a highly dynamic setting such as MANETs these
operations will be developed frequently. Anyway, there should
be pointed out that similar schemes based on different NP-
complete graph problems might be described. The only feature
demanded to the problems chosen is that the solutions may be
easily updated when small changes occur in the network. This
is just the case of the Vertex Cover, Independent Set or Clique
Problems, for instance.
One of the key points to assure the correct operation of
GASMAN is the use of a chat application through broadcast
that makes it possible for legitimate on-line nodes to send
a message to all on-line users. Such an application allows
publishing all the information associated to the update of the
network. Although secrecy is not necessary for chat messages,
because they are not more than gibberish for illegitimate
nodes, it is required that only the on-line legitimate nodes
execute the chat application.
The information received through the chat application dur-
ing an interval of time must be stored by each on-line node
in a FIFO queue. Such data should be stored by each on-line
node, allowing in this way the updating of the authentication
information not only to it but also to all the off-line legitimate
nodes whose access will be granted. Such a period is an
essential parameter in the system because it states both the
maximum off-line time allowed for any legitimate node, and
the frequency of broadcasting the proofs of life. Consequently,
such a parameter should be previously agreed among all the
legitimate nodes of the network.
A generic life-cycle of a MANET has three major phases
that are described below (see figure 1):
Initialization:
Each initial member in the original network will be
securely provided, either off-line or on-line, with a
secret piece of information. The knowledge of the
secret network key will be used during access control
in order to prove the node’s eligibility for accessing
to the protected resources or to offer service to the
network. After completing this stage, the legitimate
nodes are ready to actively participate in the network.
Access Control:
The access control process allows a legitimate node
to prove its network membership to an on-line node.
These legitimate nodes must demonstrate knowledge
of the secret network key by using a challenge-
response scheme.
On-line Session:
Once the legitimate node reaches an on-line state
in the network, it gets full access to the protected
resources such as the chat application. At the same
time, it may offer services such as the insertion of
new nodes. There should be taken into account that
the secret network key will be updated according to
the network evolution. Hence, if a node is off-line for
too long, its secret key will expire. In such a case,
the legitimate node would have to be re-inserted by
an on-line legitimate node.
Since in our proposal the secrecy of the network key is
provided by the difficulty of the HCP, the number of on-line
legitimate nodes is a crucial parameter. In consequence, as
soon as the number of on-line legitimate nodes becomes too
small (when comparing it with certain threshold parameter),
the network termination is carried out and therefore, the life-
cycle of the network ends.
Probably, the most remarkable aspect in our proposal is that
no meaningful information may be stolen even if an adversary
is able to reads the whole information published through
the chat application, or even if it eavesdrops the information
exchanged between a legitimate prover and verifier at the time
of executing the access control protocol.
In the following, the basic notation used throughout the
proposal is explained.
Fig. 1. Node Life-Cycle
• Gt = (Vt, Et) denotes the undirected graph used at stage
t of the network life-cycle.
• vi ∈ Vt represents both a vertex of the graph and a
legitimate node.
• n = |Vt| is the order of Gt, which coincides with the
number of legitimate nodes.
• NGt(vi) denotes the neighbours of node vi in the graph
Gt.
• Π(Vt) represents a random permutation over the vertex
set Vt
• Π(Gt) denotes the graph isomorphic to Gt built after
applying permutation Π(Vt).
• c ∈r C indicates that an element c is chosen at random
with uniform distribution from a set C.
• HCt designates the Hamiltonian cycle used at stage t.
• Π(HCt) represents the Hamiltonian cycle HCt in the
graph Π(Gt).
• NHCt(vi) denotes the neighbours of node vi in the
Hamiltonian cycle HCt.
• S and A stand for the supplicant and the authenticator,
respectively. This notation is used both while an insertion
phase and the execution of a ZKP-based access control
are carried out.
• S 
 A symbolizes when node S contacts A.
• A ↔ S : information means that A and S agree on
information
• A s→ S : information means that A sends
information to S through a secure channel.
• A o→ S : information means that A sends
information to S through an open channel.
• A b→ network : information represents when A
broadcasts information to all on-line legitimate nodes.
• A b↔ network : information represents a two-step
procedure where A broadcasts information to all on-
line legitimate nodes of the network, and receives their
answers.
• h stands for a public hash function.
• T denotes the threshold period that a legitimate nodes
may be off-line without been excluded of the network.
III. GASMAN DESCRIPTION
This section contains the description of the procedures that
form part of the GASMAN architecture, including all the
specific details about network initialization, node insertion,
access control, proofs of life and node deletion.
A. Network Initialization
The proposed protocol requires the definition of an initial-
ization phase where the secret information associated to the
process of identification is generated and distributed within
the initial network. This initialization phase consists in the
definition of the graph used for the development of the proto-
col. Such a graph should be generated with the participation
of all the original members of the network. Furthermore, the
initialization phase also implies the shared generation by the
initial legitimate members of the network of a solution to the
HCP in such a graph.
In our proposal, as in trust graphs [9], the graph vertexes set
corresponds to the set of nodes in the actual network during
its whole life-cycle. Consequently, the initialization process
starts from a set V0 of n vertexes corresponding to the nodes
of the initial network. Hence, each vertex sub-index may be
used as ID (IDentification) for the corresponding node. The
first step of the initialization process consists of generating
cooperatively and secretly a random permutation Π of such a
set. Once this generation is completed, each legitimate node
should know a Hamiltonian cycle HC0 corresponding exactly
to such a permutation. Finally, the partial graph formed by
the edges corresponding to such a Hamiltonian cycle HC0,
is completed by adding n groups of 2mn edges, producing the
initial edge set E0. Here, m stands for the number of edges
that the initial graph will have after the initialization stage.
Each one of these n groups of edges will be generated by
vi, i = 1, 2, ..., n according to the following restrictions: they
must have vi as one of its vertexes, while the other one will
be randomly generated. Note that the size 2mn of those edge
subsets must be large enough so that the size of the resulting
edge set |E0| = m guarantees the difficulty of the HCP in the
graph G0.
Initialization Algorithm
Input: V0, with |V0| = n.
1. The n nodes of the network generate cooperatively,
secretly and randomly the cycle HC0 = Π (V0).
2. ∀vi ∈ V0, vi builds the set
NG0(i) = {{vj ∈r V0} ∪NHC0(i)}
with |NG0(i)| = 2mn .
3. ∀vi ∈ V0 : vi b→ network : NG0(i).
4. ∀vi ∈ V0 : vi merges:
E0 =
⋃
i=1,2,...,n
{(vi, vj) : vj ∈ NG0(i)} .
Output:G0 = (V0, E0), with |E0| = m.
Once the creation of the initial instance of the problem has
been carried out through the contribution of all the nodes of
the network, each node will know a Hamiltonian cycle in the
resulting 2mn -regular graph. From then on, each time a new
user S wants to become a member of the network, it has to
contact a legitimate member A in order to follow the insertion
procedure explained in the following section.
B. Node Insertion
Let us suppose that we are at stage t of the network life-
cycle when a user S contacts a legitimate member A of the
network to become a member of the network. Once S has
convinced A to accept its membership in, the first step that A
should carry out is to assign S the lowest vertex number vi
not assigned so fat in the vertex set Vt. Afterwards, A should
broadcast such an assignment to all on-line legitimate nodes in
order to prevent another simultaneous insertion with the same
identifier. If A receives less than n/2 answers to the previous
message, she stops the insertion procedure because the number
of nodes that are aware of the insertion is not large enough.
Otherwise, A develops the corresponding update of the secret
Hamiltonian cycle HCt by selecting at random two neighbour
vertexes vj and vk in order to insert the new node vi between
them. Additionally, A chooses at random a subset of 2mn − 2
nodes in Vt such that none of them is its neighbour in HCt.
Finally, A broadcasts the set of neighbours NGt+1(vi) of S in
the new graph Gt+1 .
Each time a node receives a graph update, it should secretly
modify the corresponding Hamiltonian cycle. In order to
achieve it, it uses the information provided to identify the
unique position (according to the new edge set Et+1) in the
cycle where the new node can be inserted. In this way, it will
be able to easily update the secret network key by simply
inserting the vertex vi between the vertexes vj and vk. At the
same time, the authenticator node A must send the supplicant
node S both the graph Gt+1 (deploying an open channel), and
the Hamiltonian cycle HCt+1 (through a secure channel).
Insertion Algorithm
Input: At stage t a supplicant node S wants to become a
member of the network.
1. S 
 A.
2. Node S convinces node A to accept its membership
in the network.
2. A assigns S the identifier vi such that i = min{l :
vl 6∈ Vt}
3. A b↔ network : vi
3.1 If A receives less than n/2 answers, she stops
the insertion procedure.
3.2 Otherwise:
3.2.1 A chooses:
(vj , vk) : vj ∈r Vt, vk ∈r NCHt(vj)
3.2.2 A chooses at random:
NGt+1(vi) = {vj , vk}∪{w1, w2, ..., w 2mn −2}
such that NGt+1(vi) ⊆ Vt∧∀wl1 , wl2 : wl1 6∈
NCHt(wl2)}
3.2.3 A b→ network : NGt+1(vi)
3.2.4 Each on-line node updates Gt by defining
Vt+1 = Vt ∪ {vi}, Et+1 = Et ∪ NGt+1(vi)
and HCt+1 = HCt \{(vj , vk)}∪{(vj , vi)∪
(vi, vk)}
3.2.5 A o→ vi : Gt+1
3.2.6 A s→ vi : HCt+1
Output: The supplicant node S becomes a legitimate mem-
ber of the network.
C. Access Control
If a legitimate node S has been off-line or out-of-coverage
from stage t and wants to re-enter into the network at stage r,
its first step should be to contact a legitimate on-line member
A. Afterwards, A should check whether the period S has
been off-line is not greater than T . In this case, S has to
be authenticated by A through a ZKP based on its knowledge
of the secret solution HCt on the graph Gt.
The aforementioned ZKP begins with the agreement be-
tween A and S on the number of iterations l to execute.
From there on, in each iteration, S will choose a random
permutation Πj(Vt) on the vertex set that will be used to
build a graph Π(Gt) isomorphic to Gt. The hash value of both
the permutation h(Πj(Vt)) and the Hamiltonian cycle in the
graph h(Πj(HCt)) are then sent to A. When this information
is received by A, it chooses a bit bj at random (bj ∈r {0, 1}).
Depending on the selected value, S will provide A with the
image of the Hamiltonian cycle through the isomorphism,
or with the specific definition of the isomorphism. In the
verification phase, A will check that the received information
was correctly built.
Once the authentication of supplicant S has been success-
fully carried out, the authenticator A gives him the necessary
information to have full access to the protected resources such
as the chat application, for example.
Access Control Algorithm
Input: At stage r a supplicant node S that has been off-line
since stage t wants to re-enter into the network.
1. S 
 A
2. S o→ A : Gt
3. A checks whether r − t ≤ T
4. if r − t > T then S is not authenticated
5. otherwise:
– A↔ S : l
– for j = 1, 2, · · · , l
5.1 S chooses Πj(Vt) and builds Πj(Gt) and
Πj(HCt), the graph isomorphic to Gt
and the corresponding Hamiltonian cycle,
respectively.
5.2 S o→ A : {h(Πj(Vt)), h(Πj(HCt))}
5.3 A chooses the challenge bj ∈r {0, 1}
5.4 A o→ S : bj
5.4.1 If bj = 0 then S
o→ A :
{Πj(Gt),Πj(HCt)}
5.4.2 If bj = 1 then S
o→ A : Πj
5.5 A verifies that
a) Πj(HCt)) is a valid Hamiltonian cycle
in Πj(Gt), if bj = 0
b) the hash function h applied on Πj(Gt)
coincides with h(Πj(Gt)), if bj = 1
– if ∃j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , l} such that the verification
is negative, then S is isolated.
– otherwise A s→ S : the necessary information
to have full access to protected resources of
the network.
Output: Node S is connected on-line to the network.
D. Proofs of Life
All on-line legitimate nodes have to confirm their presence
in an active way. Such a confirmation is carried out every
period of time T . It consists in broadcasting a message (proof-
of-life) to all on-line legitimate nodes.
If some insertion happens during such a period, a proof
of life of every on-line legitimate node will be distributed
together with the information necessary for the insertion
procedure. Otherwise, only the proof of life is required. During
such a broadcast every node adds its own proof of life to the
broadcast. In this way, when the broadcast reaches the last
node, a broadcast back starts containing the proofs of life of
all on-line legitimate nodes.
Proof-of-Life Algorithm
Input: At stage t node A is an on-line legitimate node of
the network.
1. A initializes its clock = 0 just after its last proof of
life.
2. if clock > T then 2.1
1) A b↔ network : A′s proof of life
2.1.1 If A receives less than n/2 proofs of life as
answers to her broadcast, she stops her proof
of life and puts back her clock.
2.1.2 Otherwise: A b→ network : Received
proofs of life
Output: At stage t + 1 node A continues being an on-line
legitimate node of the network of the network.
E. Node Deletion
The deletion procedure is mainly based on the confirmation
of the active presence of on-line legitimate nodes through their
proofs of life. Each node should update its stored graph by
deleting all those nodes that have not sent any proof of life
after a period T . This fact implies that each node that has not
proven its presence will be deleted from the network, as well
as from the Hamiltonian cycle.
Node deletions are explicitly communicated to all on-line
legitimate nodes in the second step of broadcasts of proofs of
life. This way to proceed allows any node that is off-line in
that moment will be able to update its stored graph as soon
as it gets access to the network.
Deletion Algorithm
Input: At stage t, a node vi is an off-line legitimate node
of the network.
1. A initializes her clock = 0.
2. if clock > T then
2.1 ∀vi ∈ Vt: A checks vi’s proof of life in A’s
FIFO queue.
2.2 A updates Vt+1 = Vt \ {vi ∈ Vt with no proof
}.
2.3 A updates Et+1 = Et \ {(vi, vj) : vi ∈ Vt with
no proof, vj ∈ NGt(vi)} ∪ {(vj , vk) : vj , vk ∈
NHCt(vi)}.
2.4 A updates HCt+1 = HCt\{(vj , vi), (vi, vk)}∪
(vj , vk) : vi ∈ Vt with no proof, vj , vk ∈
NHCt(vi)
3. If A started the broadcast used for the vi’s deletion, A
adds this information to the second step of the proof-
of-life broadcast: A b→ network : vi is deleted.
Output: At stage t + 1 the node vi has been deleted both
from the network and from the graph.
This procedure guarantees a limited growth of the graph
that is used in authentication, and at the same time, allows
that always the legitimate nodes set corresponds exactly to
the vertexes in that graph. Apart from this, it is remarkable
the fact that thanks to this procedure the recovery of legit-
imate members of the network that have been disconnected
momentarily is possible.
IV. ASSUMPTIONS AND SECURITY ANALYSIS
This proposal initially assumes the ideal environment where
all legitimate nodes are honest and where no adversary may
compromise a legitimate node of the network in order to read
its secret stored information. Such assumptions are well suited
as a basic model in order to decide under which circumstances
the GASMAN is applicable to MANETs. For instance, a
possible adaptation of the proposal in order to avoid those
hypothesis could be defining a threshold scheme to be used
in every step of the GASMAN, so that every proof of life,
insertion, access control or deletion operation should be done
by a coalition of on-line nodes. Then, a dishonest node would
not affect the correct operation of the network.
It is clear that the proposal inherits some problems of the
distributed trust model such as the important necessity that
legitimate nodes cooperate. Consequently, it is advisable to
include a scheme to stimulate node cooperation.
Finally, another requirement of the GASMAN is the es-
tablishment of a secure channel for the insertion procedure.
However, that aspect may be easily fulfilled thanks to the fact
that most wireless devices are able to communicate with each
other via Bluetooth wireless technology.
With respect to possible attacks and due to the lack of a
centralized structure, it is natural that possible DOS (Denial
Of Service) attacks have as their main objective the chat
application. In order to protect the GASMAN against this
threat it must be assured that chat messages, although are
publicly readable, may be only sent by legitimate on-line
members of the network. Another important aspect related to
the use of the chat application is the necessary synchronization
of the on-line nodes, so a common network clock is necessary.
This requirement has been implemented during simulations
through the chat application.
MANETs are in general vulnerable to different threats such
as identity theft (spoofing) and the man-in-the-middle attack.
Such attacks are difficult to prevent in environments where
membership and network structure are dynamic and the pres-
ence of central directories cannot be assumed. However, our
proposal is resistant to spoofing attacks because access control
is granted through a ZKP. It implies that any information
published through the chat application or sent openly during
the execution of access control mechanism becomes useless.
On the other hand, the goal of the man-in-the-middle attack
is either to change a sent message or to gain some useful
information by one of the intermediate nodes. Again, the use
of ZKPs in our protocol implies that reading any transferred
information does not reveal any useful information about the
secret, so changing the message is not possible since only
legitimate nodes whose access has been allowed can use the
chat application.
Another active attack that might be especially dangerous
in MANETs is the so-called Sybil attack. It happens when a
node tries to get and use multiple identities. The most extreme
case of this type of attacks is the establishment of a false
centralized authority who states the identities of legitimate
members. However, this specific attack is not possible against
our scheme due to its distributed nature. In the GASMAN,
the responsibility of controlling general Sybil attacks will be
shared among all the on-line nodes. If an authenticator node
detects that a supplicant node is trying to get access to the
network by using an ID that is yet being used on-line, such
access control must be denied and the corresponding node
must be isolated. The same happens when any on-line node
detects that an authenticator node is trying to insert a new
member into the network with a new ID, and such a node
has yet assigned as a vertex ID. Again, such insertion must be
denied and the corresponding supplicant node must be isolated.
Anyway, if a Sybil attacker enters the network, any of its
neighbours will detect it as soon as it sends proofs of life for
different vertexes ID.
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
We now analyze the efficiency of the proposal both from
the energy consumption and from computational complexity
points of view. We consider the energy consumption which is
the result of transmissions of data and processor activities due
to authentication tasks. In the proposal there are two phases
when computational overhead is more significant: the ZKP-
based access control and the periodic checking of stored ele-
ments in the FIFO queue. A reduction on the number of rounds
of ZKP has a direct effect on the total exchanged messages
size in insertions, but a trade-off should be maintained between
protocols robustness and performance. Indeed, regarding total
data transmission over wireless links, the ZKPs take less than
10% in a usual situation.
The dominant time-consuming jobs are the periodic proofs
of life, which accounts for around 90% of the total exchanged
message size in many cases. However, we found that these
compulsory proofs of life imply an incentive technique for
stimulating cooperation in authentication tasks. This is due to
the fact that nodes that are broadcasters of deletion queries
or authenticators in insertions or access controls are exempted
from their obligation to broadcast their proofs of life.
In order to reduce data communication cost of the protocol,
an increase on the threshold period T might be an option,
but again an acceptable balance should be kept. According to
our experiments, T should depend directly on the number of
legitimate and/or on-line nodes in order to prevent a possible
bandwidth overhead in large networks.
For the performance analysis of the proposal we used the
Network Simulator NS-2 with the DSR routing protocol. We
created several Tcl based NS-2 scripts in order to produce
various output trace files that have been used both to do
data processing and to visualize the simulation. Within our
simulation we used the visualization tool of Network Animator
NAM and the NS-2 trace files analyzer of Tracegraph. For the
simulation of mobility we used the Setdest program in order
to generate movement pattern files using the random Waypoint
algorithm.
An example of simulation is shown graphically in Figure 2.
Basically, it consists of generating a scenario file that describes
the movement pattern of the nodes and a communication file
that describes the traffic in the network. These files are used
to produce trace files that are analyzed to measure various
parameters. An excerpt of the trace files corresponding to the
same example is shown in Table I.
The trace files are used to visualize the simulation using
NAM, while the measurement values are used as data for
plots with Tracegraph. The final graph and Hamiltonian cycle
associated to the example network is shown in Figure 3where
green is used to indicate the Hamiltonian cycle, blue is used
for the inserted nodes and red is used for the edges deleted
from the Hamiltonian cycle when inserting new nodes.
In order to study the effectiveness of the GASMAN, we
studied it in a set of realistic scenarios. In particular, we
Fig. 2. Example of Network Simulation with NS-2
Fig. 3. Example of Final Associated Graph and Hamiltonian Cycle
used the most commonly used mobility model by the research
community, the so-called Random Waypoint Model, which
uses pause times and random changes in destination and speed.
An extensive number of simulations using NS-2 simulator
with 802.11 MAC and DSR routing protocols in order to see
the effects of different metrics by varying network density and
topology were run. Within the simulations, relationships can be
established anytime two nodes are located in close proximity
and the random walk mobility model was used with various
pause time and maximum speed. In particular, we varied the
number of nodes from 15 to 100. Also, our architecture was
evaluated with 250 x 250, 500 x 500, and 750 x 750 m2 square
area of ad-hoc network. In each case, the nodes move around
with 0.5 second pause time and 20m/s maximum speeds. The
transmission range of the secure channel is 5 meters while
that of the data channel is fixed to 250 meters. The period of
simulation varied from 60 to 200 seconds. We also changed
the probabilities of insertions and deletions in each second
from 5% to 25%, in order to modify the mobility rate and
antenna range of nodes from 2 to 15 m/s and 100 to 250 meters
respectively. This range also defines different frequencies of
accesses to the network.
The first conclusions we obtained from the simulations are:
• The protocol scales perfectly to any sort of networks with
different levels of topology changes.
• Node density is a key factor for the mean time of
insertions, but such a factor is not as big as it might
be previously assumed since nodes do not forward two
packets of data corresponding to the same proof of life
coming from two different nodes.
• A right choice of parameter T should be done according
to number of nodes, bandwidth of wireless connections
and computation and storing capacities of nodes.
• A positive aspect of the proposal is that the requirements
in the devices’ hardware are very low.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND OPEN QUESTIONS
Successful authentication in mobile ad-hoc networks is criti-
cal for assuring secure and effective operation of the supported
application. This work describes a new authentication scheme,
the so-called GASMAN, which was specially designed for
Time Event HC
0.1 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 are legitimate 8,3,9,7,4,2,6,5,1,10,0
1.29 Insertion of Node 14 is broadcast by Node 4 8,3,9,7,4,14,2,6,5,1,10,0
1.30 Nodes 3, 1, 0 do not answer to the proof of life
3.29 Node 0 reaches 8 and starts a ZKP for re-insertion
8.69 Node 3 reaches 4 and starts a ZKP for re-insertion
9.40 Node 1 reaches 10 and starts a ZKP for re-insertion
11.65 Node 1 turns off
13.97 Proof of life started by Node 3
14.27 Nodes 1, 2 do not answer to the proof of life
14.82 Node 2 reaches 14 and starts a ZKP for re-insertion
17.27 Proof of life started by Node 2
17.57 Nodes 1, 5 do not answer to the proof of life
21.71 Node 5 turns off
31.40 Node 1 turns on and Node 2 is chosen for the ZKP
31.46 Node 4 turns off
32.51 Proof of life started by Node 1
32.78 Nodes 4, 5, 6 do not answer to the proof of life
34.29 Node 6 reaches 2 and starts a ZKP for re-insertion
38.51 Proof of life started by Node 6
38.79 Nodes 4, 5 do not answer to the proof of life
41.46 Node 1 turns off
53.25 Node 1 turns on and Node 0 is chosen for the ZKP
59.61 Proof of life started by Node 6
59.99 Nodes 4, 5 do not answer to the proof of life
64.26 Node 5 is deleted 8,3,9,7,4,14,2,6,1,10,0
64.71 Node 2 turns off
72.58 Node 4 turns on and Node 0 is chosen for the ZKP
75.41 Insertion of Node 13 is broadcast by Node 14 8,3,9,7,4,14,2,13,6,1,10,0
75.43 Node 2 does not answer to the proof of life
TABLE I
EXAMPLE OF TRACE
MANETs. Such a protocol supports knowledge-based member
authentication in server-less environments. The overall goal
of the GASMAN has been to design a strong authentication
scheme that is able to react and adapt to network topology
changes without the necessity of any centralized authority.
Its core technique consists of a Zero-Knowledge Proof, in
order to avoid the transference of any relevant information.
Furthermore, the proposal is balanced since the procedures that
the legitimate members of the network have to carry out when
the network is updated (insertion or deletion of nodes) imply
identical work for every legitimate member of the network.
The development of an initial simulation of the proposal
through the NS-2 network simulator has been carried out. The
definitive simulation results will be included in a forthcoming
version of this work. Also, the study of different applications,
practical limitations and possible extensions of the GASMAN
may be considered open problems.
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